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ABSTRACT
The Internet of things (IoT) has become an integral part of our life
at both work and home. However, these IoT devices are prone to vul-
nerability exploits due to their low cost, low resources, the diversity
of vendors, and proprietary firmware. Moreover, short range com-
munication protocols (e.g., Bluetooth or ZigBee) open additional
opportunities for the lateral movement of an attacker within an orga-
nization. Thus, the type and location of IoT devices may significantly
change the level of network security of the organizational network.
In this paper, we quantify the level of network security based on
an augmented attack graph analysis that accounts for the physical
location of IoT devices and their communication capabilities. We
use the depth-first branch and bound (DFBnB) heuristic search al-
gorithm to solve two optimization problems: Full Deployment with
Minimal Risk (FDMR) and Maximal Utility without Risk Deteriora-
tion (MURD). An admissible heuristic is proposed to accelerate the
search. The proposed method is evaluated using a real network with
simulated deployment of IoT devices. The results demonstrate (1)
the contribution of the augmented attack graphs to quantifying the
impact of IoT devices deployed within the organization on security,
and (2) the effectiveness of the optimized IoT deployment.
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1 INTRODUCTION
It is estimated that by 2020 more than 20 billion IoT devices will be
deployed in the world [21]. Most IoT products are not equipped to
deal with security and privacy risks, which can turn them into the
weakest link of organizational networks. The risk of IoT devices to
the security of an organization is underestimated in many cases when
an organization’s IT department relies solely on network separation
to isolate IoT devices from other IT assets. Such an approach dis-
regards some of the unique properties of IoT devices, such as light
or sound emissions, various sensors, and diverse communication
protocols such as NFC, Bluetooth, ZigBee and LoRA, in addition
to standard Wi-Fi. The advanced capabilities of IoT devices can be
exploited by an attacker for lateral movement within an organization,
shoulder surfing, and more, making them a valuable asset for an
attacker.
With respect to hardening IoT security, most prior research fo-
cuses on the security of individual IoT devices [20, 32, 47], the
security of an IoT protocol [24, 33, 41, 43, 49], or the the security
of a network that consists solely of IoT devices [12, 16, 39, 46] (see
Section 3.1 for more details). To the best our knowledge, there is no
previous related research aimed at identifying the optimal (security
risk-wise) deployment of devices within the physical space. The lo-
cation of an IoT device within an organization can have unintended
effects on the network topology such as bridging between networks
through short-range communication protocols (see Sections 2.2 and
2.3). We use the following example to demonstrate the problem.
Example 1.1. Assume, for example, an office with two confer-
ence rooms and a kitchen (Figure 1). Each conference room has a
computer (COMP1 and COMP2) connected through Wi-Fi to two
different VLANs (VLAN 1 and VLAN 2 respectively). COMP1 also
has Bluetooth. A smart refrigerator in the kitchen is connected to
VLAN 3 and has Internet connectivity. All other IoT devices in the
office are connected to VLAN 3 as well. The office purchased two
televisions (TV 1 and TV 2) to replace the old projectors in the con-
ference rooms. Both televisions are connected to VLAN 3 via Wi-Fi;
TV1 is also equipped with Bluetooth.
Should we installTV 1 in Conference Room 1 andTV 2 in Con-
ference Room 2 or vice versa? To answer this question assume,
for example, that unbeknownst to the organization, a sophisticated
malware has managed to infect one of the computers in the orga-
nizational network. Further, assume that the malware is equipped
with the necessary exploits to hop between devices in the office.
If TV 1 is placed in Conference Room 1, the attacker could take
advantage of the fact that bothTV 1 andCOMP1 have Bluetooth and
create an attack path to the refrigerator. However, if TV 1 is placed
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Figure 1: Illustration of the office in example 1.1. Different col-
ors of Wi-Fi represent different VLANs.
in Conference Room 2 this attack path will no longer be available to
the attacker.
The risk of potential multi-step attacks such the one described
in Example 1.1 can be estimated using attack graphs [28, 30]. An
attack graph is a model of a computer network that encompasses
computer connectivity, vulnerabilities, assets, and exploits. It is used
to represent a collection of complex multi-step attack paths (hereafter
referred to as attack plans) and can be used to assess and quantify
security risk (see Section 2.1 for more details).
In this paper, the proposed method augments attack graph anal-
ysis to account for the physical location of IoT devices and their
communication capabilities. (see Section 4). Relying on the new
attack graphs, we quantify the risk of adding an IoT device to a
given network and show that the number of short attack paths may
increase by 19% due to the deployment of only six IoT devices in
a small to medium sized enterprise; short attack plans often pose
the greatest threat, because they represent an attack that needs fewer
resources to be executed.
We also optimize the deployment of IoT devices in order to re-
duce the negative security implications of such deployment (see
Section 5). Two optimization problems are presented: the Full De-
ployment with Minimal Risk (FDMR) problem where all required
IoT devices should be deployed with minimal security implications
and the Maximal Utility without Risk Deterioration (MURD) prob-
lem where the maximal number of IoT devices should be deployed
without increasing the security risk of the network. We use depth-
first branch and bound (DFBnB) heuristic search algorithm to solve
both optimization problems and suggest an admissible heuristic func-
tion to accelerate the search. Our experiments show that optimal
deployment of IoT devices can reduce the number of possible attack
plans by 18% (see Section 6).
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Attack Graphs
An attack graph is a model of a computer network that encompasses
computer connectivity, vulnerabilities, assets, and exploits [28, 30].
Attack graphs are used to represent collections of complex multi-step
Figure 2: Attack Graph of Example 2.1. Exploit/action nodes
are represented by blue ovals; fact nodes are represented by
green rectangles; privilege nodes are represented by orange di-
amonds.
attack scenarios traversing an organization from an initial entry point
to the most critical assets. By analyzing the attack graph, a security
analyst can assess the risks of potential intrusions and devise effec-
tive protective strategies. The attack graph analysis methodology
contains three main stages: (1) network and vulnerability scanning,
(2) attack graph modeling, and (3) attack graph analysis.
In the first stage, the Nessus vulnerability scanner [7] is used in
order to map the vulnerabilities of all of the hosts in the organization.
Connectivity between the hosts can be identified manually by system
administrators based on the organizational network topology and
firewall configurations. Nessus, Nmap, or other network scanners
can aid in the connectivity assessment process.
Network connectivity and vulnerability reports are processed by
MulVAL [29] to generate an attack graph representation in planning
domain definition language (PDDL). An attack graph consists of
privilege nodes, exploit/action nodes, and fact nodes. In an attack
graph, a privilege node represents the information gained or the
access privileges that the attacker obtains (represented by triangles in
the graph). An exploit/action node represents the action the attacker
needs to exploit a vulnerability (represented by ovals). The edges of
exploit nodes are for preconditions and postconditions of the exploit.
A fact node represents a network condition that needs to exist in
order for the attacker to exploit the vulnerability (represented by
rectangles). To gain a privilege, an attacker needs to execute one of
the actions leading to it (logical OR). To use an exploit, the attacker
needs all of the privileges and the facts that lead to the exploit
(Logical AND). An exploit node needs all of these preconditions
leading to it to be executed, and once executed, the attacker gains all
of the postconditions the exploit node leads to [4, 26, 28, 37].
Example 2.1. Figure 2 presents an abstract attack graph of the
situation described in example 1.1. At the top of the figure, two fact
nodes (nodes 1 and 2) that represent two facts of the system can be
seen (green rectangles). Access between COMP1 and TV 1 can only
created if these two conditions exist, as can be seen from the blue
oval, which represents an exploit node (node 3). This access allows
the attacker to use the Bluetooth connectivity ofTV 1, as represented
by the orange diamond (node 4), meaning that the attacker can obtain
control of TV 1 via COMP1.
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Following the construction of an attack graph, the graph’s PDDL
representation can be used as a domain model for variety of plan-
ners. A typical task is finding the optimal attack plan or estimating
the likelihood of a successful attack given the attack graph of an
organization [26, 38, 42]. Consequently, attack graphs can be used
for hardening network security through a variety of attack graph
optimizations [1, 17, 27, 31].
2.2 Security in the Internet of Things
Traditional security solutions such as firewalls, IDSs, anti-viruses,
and software patches are not suitable for IoT devices. The three
major reasons for this are [45]: (1) Types of policies: a single app
may use several IoT devices, communicating explicitly (e.g., via
Wi-Fi or Bluetooth) or implicitly (e.g., an IoT light bulb can be
triggered by an IoT light sensor). The outcome is a complex and
dynamic network which can be hard to secure using a single security
policy (e.g., with firewalls). (2) Signatures and anomalous behavior
recognition: some security methods store anomalies and signatures
on the device to recognize and detect threats. Due to the diversity of
IoT devices and manufacturers, these methods will be inadequate,
mainly because of the constant need to update and maintain the
device to support these tools. (3) Enforcement mechanism: IoT
devices have low computation abilities, low power consumption, and
do not run full-fledged operating systems. Most common security
methods need all of the above to operate and therefore are impractical
to implement on IoT devices. (4) Unsupported devices: the longevity
of IoT devices can lead to deployed devices that vendors no longer
support. In that way, vulnerable devices (with default passwords or
unpatched bugs) can remain in the organization.
Moreover, the competitive IoT device market compels vendors
to try and get their products out as fast as they can, prioritizing
functionality and the user experience, and ignoring the security
aspect. In general, most products hardly deal with security and
privacy risks, making them the weakest link in terms of security
and the target of attackers interested in breaking into networks and
harming systems or leaking information [45]. Thus, despite the fact
that security was recognized as a central issue of the IoT market
as early as 2011 by Bandyopadhyay et al. [5], it still continues to
remain a challenge today.
2.3 Short Range Communication Protocols
When connecting a device to a network it is possible to use two cate-
gories of networking technologies. The first and simplest category is
to connect using standard existing network technologies such as Wi-
Fi and Ethernet. The second category is to connect using different
wireless technologies that are more suitable for some devices, e.g.,
technologies that are more appropriate for devices that require low
energy consumption protocols. These protocols are short-range com-
munication protocols, due to their requirement for short proximity
in order to perform a connection.
Currently, in the second category there are several communication
methods that can be used, including: ZigBee, Z-Wave, Powerline,
Bluetooth 4.0, and other radio frequency protocols, but no standard
protocol exists. Both Z-Wave and ZigBee are considered secure,
but implementation flaws and manufacturer mistakes make them
vulnerable [6].
In our research, we focus on ZigBee and Bluetooth, since they are
ones of the most common wireless technologies used to connect IoT
devices. First, we start with the ZigBee protocol, which guarantees
low power consumption and a two-way, reliable, wireless communi-
cations standard for short-range applications. It is open-source and
has advantages such as easy deployment and global usage.
The ZigBee protocol was created with security considerations
in mind, but consumer demand for cheap devices with long life ex-
pectancy often caused vendors to sacrifice security, which led to poor
implementation of the protocol [49]; this, in turn, led to major secu-
rity issues such as data compromising or information sniffing. [41].
For example, Vaccari et al. [41] focused on the security aspects of
the ZigBee protocol. The study identified important security issues
and presented an attack on the protocol which enabled the attacker
to compromise the data transferring in the network. Morgner et
al. [24] described a novel attack that shows that the ZigBee Light
Link standard is insecure by design. Wright et al. [43] published
KillerBee, a penetration testing tool which allows ZigBee traffic
to be sniffed and analyzed. Ronen et al. [33] found a major bug in
the ZigBee protocol in Philip Hue smart lamps. They were able to
perform an over-the-air firmware update, thereby infecting the lamp
with a worm that can spread to any of the lamp’s neighbors.
Bluetooth was developed by a group called the Bluetooth Special
Interest Group (SIG) in May 1998. Today, a lot of smartphones,
sports devices, sensors, and medical devices have Bluetooth. The
protocol become widely used because of its low cost and low power
consumption.
In [34], techniques were presented for eavesdropping on devices
using Bluetooth. An extended review of Bluetooth threats and pos-
sible attacks was performed by Minar et al. , Sandya et al. and
Dunnin [10, 22, 35], and recently, Cope et al. [9] investigated the
currently available tools to exploit vulnerabilities in Bluetooth. In
conclusion, many Bluetooth versions that are in use today, have a
wide variety of security vulnerabilities.
In addition to the security issues, the number of communication
protocols in an IoT device can also influence the security of the
device. If such a device is compromised by an attacker that has
hacked into one of its communication protocols, the hacker can take
advantage of the compromoised device and use the other protocols
as entry points to the network [11].
Of all the above, short-range communication protocols are an-
other aspect of IoT devices that make them insecure compare to
regular hosts.
2.4 Heuristic Search
Heuristic search is a family of techniques used to solve difficult
problems in artificial intelligence (AI). In this case, each problem
is represented by states, where each state represents the current
condition of the problem. Each problem also has a starting state
and one or more goal states. A search space is the environment in
which a search takes place, where the purpose of the search is to
find a path from the start state to one of the goal states in the search
space. Each solution represents by one goal state. The quality of the
solution is measured by the cost of the goal state. Search algorithms
make a distinction between minimum and maximum problems. In
a minimum problem, we want to find the solution with the lowest
3
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cost, and in a maximum problem the highest cost solution is desired.
Most problems are minimum problems, e.g., we want the cheapest
or the fastest solution. If not stated differently in this paper, we are
referring to a minimum problem. In our research, we use the depth-
first branch and bound algorithm [19, 48] which uses a heuristic
function to solve the problems more efficiently.
2.4.1 Heuristic. A heuristic is an estimation of the cost of the
path from node n to a goal node. The heuristic function is used to
steer the search algorithm in the direction of the goal. In an informed
way, heuristics help the algorithm guess which child out of all of the
node’s children will lead to the goal.
Admissible Heuristic. If, for any n, a heuristic function never
overestimates the cost of the best path from node n to a goal node,
then the function is referred to as an admissible heuristic function.
Note that in a maximum problem (where we want the solution with
the maximum cost) it is the opposite, i.e., a heuristic function that
never underestimates the cost of the best path.
In most search algorithms, one of the most important conditions
for a heuristic function is that it should be admissible.
2.4.2 DFBnB Algorithm. depth-first branch and bound (DFBnB)
is a depth-first search algorithm [19, 48]. The algorithm is used to
navigate through the search space and find the optimal solution. Dur-
ing the search process, DFBnB maintains the best solution found so
far. In order to perform pruning more frequently and thus accelerate
the search process, DFBnB uses a heuristic function. The algorithm
returns an optimal solution with linear memory space, assuming the
heuristic function is admissible.
DFBnB prunes subtrees of the search space whenever the algo-
rithm can prove that no solution can be found that is better than the
incumbent solution. This solution depends on the kind of problem
(i.e., minimum or maximum), which is determined by the cost of the
goal state.
3 RELATED WORK
3.1 IoT Device Deployment
There are several works regarding the deployment of IoT devices,
but most of them do not consider the security aspect. For example,
Huang et al. [16] proposed a deployment scheme used to a achieve
green networked IoT, while Skarmeta et al. [39] focused on privacy
issues and Zanella et al. [46] focused on the IoT in smart cities.
Some of the research that refers to security analyzes single IoT
devices but does not look at IoT devices as a deployment problem.
Liu et al. [20] tried to solve the problem of assessing the risk of a
single IoT device, by proposing a dynamical risk assessment method
inspired by an artificial immune system. Zhang et al. [47] and Roman
et al. [32] reviewed security issues in the IoT in terms of the security
of each device.
There are a few works that refer to deployment and network
security, but they do not take the combination of hosts (such as
computers and servers) with IoT devices into consideration. Mohsin
et al. [23] argued that the likelihood of exploiting IoT vulnerabilities
depends on the system configuration. The authors explained that
various configurations derive from different devices, technologies,
and connectivity, all of which serves the same goal but have different
risk levels. Santoso et al. [36] presented an approach to secure smart
home systems in which IoT devices are deployed, and Abie et al. [2]
introduced a risk-based adaptive security framework for the IoT
in health-care systems. The research mentioned above reflects the
many challenges of IoT security. In this respect, our work is unique
in two ways. First, it combines the security concerns of the IoT with
workstations and servers, while taking into account the possible use
of one to hack the other. Second, our network model is a generic
network that can be suitable for a variety of scenarios and is not
specific for a particular domain.
3.2 Attack Graph Optimization
Attack Graph Representation. Attack graphs have been used to es-
timate the security risk score of organizational networks [26, 38, 42],
however the specific characteristics of IoT devices were not con-
sidered in these articles. In all of this research, the structure of the
regular IT network is analyzed, taking into account the vulnerabil-
ities of workstations and servers. IoT devices introduce additional
challenges to security risk modeling through attack graphs, such as
the diverse physical locations, variety of short-range communication
protocols, cyber-physical capabilities of the devices, mobility, etc.
In this paper, we augmented the attack graph model of an organi-
zation to consider locations and short-range communication of IoT
devices, and we used the augmented attack graph model to optimize
the deployment of IoT devices throughout the organization.
Risk Score. Wang et al. [42] suggested an overall network secu-
rity score by combining individuals’ vulnerabilities regarding their
relationship in attack graphs. Singhal et al. [38] defined the risk
score as the likelihood of an attack which was derived from the like-
lihood of individual exploits. Noel et al. [26] described four families
of metrics for measuring security risk in attacks graph. Every family
was represented by one entry in a four-dimensional vector. The Eu-
clidean norm of this vector was used as the overall risk score. Gonda
et al. [14] computed the number of shortest plans in a planning graph
derived from an attack graph as a way to measure the security of
the network, and Swiler et al. [40] computed the set of near-optimal
shortest paths to identify the most exploitable components in the net-
work. Polad et al. [31] used an attack graph to estimate the security
of the network as the cost of the attack path that led to the goal.
All the above risk scores can be used to optimize the IoT deploy-
ment once the attack graph definition has been augmented to take
into account the IoT device specifications. In this paper, we adopt
Gonda’s approach to measure network security and combined it with
Polad’s method, to include the length of the shortest plans, as well
as their quantity (see Section 4.3).
Optimization Problems. Security risks can be reduced by patch-
ing vulnerabilities. However, it is not always possible to patch all vul-
nerabilities at once due to operational costs (patching often requires
significant downtime). A variety of low cost network hardening ap-
proaches can be used to prioritize the vulnerabilities (e.g., [18, 27]).
Islam et al. [17] argued that most of these methods are not scalable.
They proposed heuristic algorithms to accelerate the patch optimiza-
tion. Abadi et al. [1] used the ant colony optimization algorithm to
detect a minimum critical set of exploits. Polad et al. [31] examined
the effect of adding fake vulnerabilities in an attack graph and used
combinatorial optimization in order to find optimal assignment of
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these vulnerabilities. Almohri et al. [3] used sequential linear pro-
gramming in attack graphs to find the optimal placement of security
products (e.g., a host-based firewall) across a network. The authors
used a probabilistic model which uses Bernoulli and transformed the
attack graph into a system of linear and nonlinear equations. Noel et
al. [25] used attack graph to optimize the placement of intrusion de-
tection system (IDS) sensors to allow monitoring malicious activity
on critical paths.
In this paper we present a different optimization problem of opti-
mizing the set of IoT devices to be deployed throughout an organi-
zation with minimal implications to the network security.
3.3 IoT in Attack Graphs
Very little work has been performed on attack graphs that consist of
IoT devices. The first research performed in this area was conducted
by Ge et al. [12] who used attack graphs in conjunction with IoT
devices. However, the network used consisted only of IoT devices,
most of which were the same kind of device. The network topology
was fixed, small, and relatively uncomplicated. The authors pro-
posed a framework for IoT device security modeling with the aim
of presenting all possible attack paths in the network, evaluating the
security level, and assessing the effectiveness of different defense
strategies.
In a later work, Ge et al. [11] noted that some IoT devices use
more than one communication protocol. The writers argued that if
such a device is compromised by hacking into one of the communi-
cation protocols, the hacker can take advantage of it and use the other
protocols as entry points to the network. The paper used HARMs (hi-
erarchical attack representation models), which are models of attack
graphs used, to improve scalability [15]. The authors presented a real
scenario and showed how an attacker can take advantage of it. In the
scenario, some devices have both Wi-Fi and ZigBee communication
protocols. Also present are smart devices such as a tablet and TV that
can connect to a Philips Hue lighting system (Hue Bridge) by Wi-Fi.
This lighting system also has ZigBee which allows it to control smart
light bulbs in the house. By exploiting the tablet that runs the Hue
application, an attacker can gain control of the Hue Bridge system
and use it to control all of the smart lights. The authors noted that
the lighting hub can consist of any other smart hub, and the scenario
can also be used to hack into any smart device, not only light bulbs.
Yig˘it et al. [44] proposed COBANOT, a heuristic-based cost and
budget aware network hardening solution for IoT systems which
uses compact attack graphs [8]. This work is the first to use attack
graphs in IoT systems for network hardening. However, their ex-
periment included a small-scale attack graph that only consists of
IoT devices. In addition, none of the unique characteristics of IoT
devices, such as different protocols, mobility, physical proximity,
etc. were considered.
Our research focuses on networks that combine all kinds of hosts
and IoT devices. Also, our network’s size is larger than the networks
used in the research mentioned above.
4 IOT ATTACK GRAPHS
4.1 IoT Deployment
In a typical organization, all hosts (workstations and servers) are
connected to the organizational network via a wired or wireless
connection. Let H = {h1,h2, . . . ,hz } be the set of hosts that are part
of the organization network.
In addition to the regular hosts, the organizational network may
contain IoT devices. Let D = {d1,d2, . . . ,dm } indicates the set
of unique IoT devices. Each IoT device di has a unique identifier
(usually an IP address).
IoT devices differ by their purpose and capabilities. For example,
a refrigerator is capable of maintaining a low temperature while a
smart TV is capable of showing high definition movies. We group
IoT devices by type, e.g., refrigerator, TV, camera, smoke detector,
etc. T = {t1, t2, . . . , tn } is the set of all the IoT device types. We
denote a set of all devices that are of type t as D(t) and a single
device type d as t(d). We assume that every IoT device is part of just
one group.
Some IoT devices can only be deployed in specific predefined
designated locations. For example, the kitchen is typically the desig-
nated location for a refrigerator, while large TV screens or projectors
are found in meeting rooms. Some IoT devices such as cameras
or smoke detectors may be deployed in many different locations
throughout an organization.
Definition 4.1 (Locations). L = {l1, l2, . . . , lb } indicates the set
of unique location spots where IoT devices can be deployed. We
denote the set of locations where an IoT device of a specific type
t ∈ T can be deployed as L(t) ⊆ L. In every location spot only one
type of IoT devices can be deployed, meaning, L(t) is defined such
that the intersection of each pair of L(ti ) sets are empty, ∩t ∈L(t ) = ∅.
Because a location spot must be associated with some type of IoT
devices, the union of L(t) is equal to L, ∪t ∈L(t ) = L
Organizations may have constraints about the deployment of IoT
devices. We defined two main constraints for a device type t . The first
one is the number of locations (out of the total locations available)
that need to contain a deployed device of that type. For instance,
there are four possible locations for cameras in the hallway, but the
organization only needs to deploy two of them. The second constraint
is the number of devices there are of each type. For instance, for
one location in which a refrigerator can be deployed, there are three
possible refrigerators that the organization can purchase.
Definition 4.2 (Location Constraint). Let C be the set of all con-
straints. C(t) is a three-tuple that represents a constraint for a type t ,
C(t) = (L(t),n(t),D(t)).
L(t) is the set of locations that an IoT device of a specific type t ∈
T can be deployed (as defined in Definition 4.1).
n(t) is the number of locations that needed to be deployed out of
all locations in L(t).
D(t) is a set of all IoT devices that are of type t .
An example of a constraint can be derived from example 1.1.
Suppose the organization has three possible locations in which a
TV can be deployed (L(TV ) = {lTV1 , lTV2 , lTV3 }) but only needs to
deploy a TV in two of these locations (n(TV ) = 2). In addition,
there are four different televisions that can be deployed (D(TV ) =
{dtv1,dtv2,dtv3,dtv4}). Formally, constraint C(TV ) would be de-
fined as follow:
C(TV ) = ({lTV1 , lTV2 , lTV3 }, 2, {dtv1,dtv2,dtv3,dtv4}).
Assume that at most one IoT device can be deployed in each
location l ∈ L. The deployment of IoT devices is defined as a
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function depl : D → L∪{⊥} which maps every device to a particular
location. The special non-location symbol ⊥ signifies that a device is
not deployed. We say that a deployment is valid if it does not violate
the constraints specified in Definition 4.2.
Definition 4.3 (Valid Deployment). Let depl : D → L ∪ {⊥}
be a deployment of IoT devices. depl is valid if ∀d ∈D ,depl(d) ∈
L(t(d)) ∪ {⊥}.
We denote deplf ull as a deployment that satisfies all constraintsC
and deplempty as an empty deployment with no IoT devices de-
ployed. Note that the condition n(t) ≤ |D(t)| should be satisfied for
full deployment to exist.
Many IoT devices deployed within an organization’s premises
will likely be able to communicate with nearby hosts via short-range
communication (SRC) protocols such as ZigBee, Bluetooth, ad hoc
Wi-Fi, etc. Some hosts within the organization may also support
SRC protocols, which could allow the adversary to hop between
networks.
Definition 4.4 (Short-Range Communication). We define a set
of short-range communication protocols SRC = {p1,p2, . . .}. Let
src : D ∪H → 2SRC be a function that maps an IoT device or a host
to the subset of SRC protocols that it supports.
In the remainder of this paper we will use the term device to refer
to both IoT devices and hosts.
Any two devices connected via a SRC protocol must reside within
a certain distance from each other (i.e., the communication range).
For example, let d ∈ D be some IoT device that supports SRC
protocol p ∈ SRC, and let h ∈ H be some host that supports the
same protocol. If d is deployed in location l and h resides within
the communication range of l , then d may communicate with h and
vice versa.
Definition 4.5 (Location Range). We define the ranдe : L ∪
{⊥} → 2D∪H of a particular location as the set of hosts that may
communicate with an IoT device deployed there.
It is important to note that ranдe(l), l ∈ L is an estimation based
on the radio specification of different IoT devices. The actual set
of devices in range of IoT device deploy in location l may vary
depending on the power of the radio, obstacles, interference, etc.
For the ease of discussion we ignore the protocol type and the
specifications of the devices in Definition 4.5. The definition of
ranдe can be augmented with this additional information without
modifications to the algorithms presented. Please note that a device
can be in the range of several locations and that no devices are in the
range of the non-location ⊥ (i.e. ranдe(⊥) = ∅).
4.2 Attack Graph Definition
The potential locations of IoT devices and SRC protocols are inte-
grated in the attack graph analysis methodology after the scanning
stage and before attack graph modeling. For every possible deploy-
ment of IoT devices, that will be considered during the course of
the optimization, we augment the connectivity map of devices to
include the hypothetical connections between any IoT device d ∈ D
deployed in location depl(d) and all devices in the range of d :
ranдe(depl(d)).
Once the connectivity between all devices has been defined, we
use the standard MulVAL framework to generate an attack graph that
considers some given deployment of IoT devices. Each deployment
has a different attack graph, depending on the devices deployed. If no
IoT device is deployed the deployment is empty (deplempty ), and the
attack graph is simply the original attack graph of the organization.
We adopt the attack graph definition introduced by Ou et al. [28].
Definition 4.6 (Logical Attack Graph). Let depl be a deployment
of IoT devices in an organization. The logical attack graph Gdepl is
a tuple:
Gdepl = (Np ,Ne ,Nf ,E,M,д),
where Np , Ne , and Nf are the sets of privilege nodes, exploit nodes
and fact (leaf) nodes, respectively, and E is a set of directed edges
E ⊆ (Np × Ne ) ∪ (Ne × (Ne ∪ Nf )),
There are two types of edges in an attack graph. An edge (e,p) ∈ E
from an exploit node e ∈ Ne to a privilege node p ∈ Np means that
the attacker can gain privilege p by executing exploit e. In order to
gain a privilege, an attacker needs to execute one of the exploits
leading to it.
An edge (f , e) ∈ E from a fact node or a privilege node f ∈ Nf ∪
Np to an exploit node e ∈ Ne means that the node f is a precondition
to executing the exploit e. For example, a fact node could be a
vulnerability in the Bluetooth protocol that can be exploited if the
attacker is in the Bluetooth range of the vulnerable device. In order
to execute an exploit, the attacker needs all of the privileges and
facts that lead to the exploit.
In this paper, in contrast to the definition introduced by Ou et
al. [28], the edge orientations follow the direction of the implied
logical operation.
Next, we define the term attack plan. For that purpose, we changed
the notations from Gefen et al. [13] slightly, as follows:
pre(e) = {v ∈ Np ∪ Nf |(v, e) ∈ E} are all of the preconditions of
node e.
obt(p) = {e ∈ Ne |v ∈ Np&(e,v) ∈ E} is the set of exploits that
lead to privilege node p (the set of privileges the attacker obtained).
An attack plan is a sub-graph G ′depl of some attack graph Gdepl
that represents a scenario in which the attacker manages to reach
the goal, namely д ∈ G ′depl . Therefore, in an attack plan all of
the preconditions of an exploit e ∈ G ′depl are satisfied, and each
privilege p ∈ G ′depl is obtained by an exploit.
Definition 4.7 (Attack Plan). Let AP(Gdepl ) be all of the attack
plans of graph Gdepl . Each attack plan G ′depl ∈ AP(Gdepl ) needs to
satisfy these three conditions:
• д ∈ G ′depl
• ∀a ∈ Ne : pre(a) ⊆ G ′depl |Ne ∈ G ′depl
• ∀p ∈ Np : ∃a ∈ obt(p) ⊆ G ′depl |Np ∈ G ′depl
We consider the length of an attack plan as the number of nodes it
contains. OptLen(Gdepl ) is the length of the shortest attack plan in
graphG, a OptCnt(Gdepl ) indicates how many of the shortest attack
plans there are in graph G.
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4.3 Risk Score
The network security can be estimated by the Risk Score, where
the higher the risk score the lower the security of the network. In
an environment in which IoT devices are deployed, there are a few
aspects to consider when choosing a method for computing the
risk score.
First, the method needs to convey that the deployment of IoT
devices may generate new attack plans. Consequently, the cost of an
attack may drop and the likelihood of an attack may increase due to
the additional vulnerabilities and opportunities for lateral movement
that an attacker can exploit. Second, the method needs to indicate the
changes in different deployments and be sensitive enough to detect
the changes caused by the deployment of even a single additional
IoT device.
We consider a deployment of IoT devices that reduces the number
of options the attacker has for an attack. Therefore, in our work,
we choose to calculate the shortest attack plans, taking their length
and quantity into consideration. Gonda et al. [14] describes the
computation of the shortest attack plans in detail. As noted by the
authors, enumerating all of the attack plans is NP-hard, which means
that the running time can be exponential, however, we performed
this computation on several networks, and the running time was
short, as can also be seen in Section 6.3.
Definition 4.8 (Risk Score). R(depl) is a tuple that represents the
risk score of deployment depl . The first element is the length of the
shortest attack plan in graphGdepl , and the second element indicates
how many of the shortest attack plans there are.
R(depl) = (OptLen(Gdepl )),OptCnt(Gdepl ))
As mentioned above, we took two aspects of the shortest plans
into consideration: the length of the plan and how many of the
shortest plans there are. For example, the risk score for the scenario
in Example 1.1 is R(15, 1), since there is only one attack plan, and
this plan has all fifteen nodes in the graph (see Figure 2).
Considering only one of the above, the number of shortest plans or
the length of the shortest plan, will not provide a good estimation of
network security . Suppose a network has x shortest plans of length
l to the goal. Further suppose that after deploying an IoT device, we
now have a new plan of length z that leads to the goal, when z < l .
In this case, the total number of shortest plans will decrease to one
(1 < x). If we only took into account how many of the shortest plans
there are, it would appear that the risk score decreased (from x to
one), which implies that the network is now more secure. However,
adding a device does not, in itself, eliminate any plans (i.e., all of the
plans that existed before the device was added still exist). Therefore,
adding a device can only create new plans, and the security risk can
only increase. Only considering the length of the shortest plan is
also problematic, since a network with one plan of length x is much
more secure than a network with multiple plans of length x .
For each comparison of the risk scores of various deployments,
we compared the length of the shortest plans, and if the shortest
plans in each deployment were equal, we considered the number
of the shortest plans. Intuitively, the risk increases as the possible
attack plans become shorter and as more of the shortest attack plans
are added.
Definition 4.9 (Deployment Comparison). Let deplX and deplY
be two deployments of IoT devices. We say that deplX is superior to
deplY , denoted as deplX ≺ deplY , if and only if
OptLen(Gdeplx ) > OptLen(Gdeply )∨
[OptLen(Gdeplx ) = OptLen(Gdeply )∧
OptCnt(Gdeplx ) < OptCnt(Gdeply )]
5 DEPLOYMENT OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
In this section, we introduce the terms and notation used to define the
two IoT deployment optimization problems: (1) Full Deployment
with Minimal Risk (FDMR), and (2) Maximal Utility without Risk
Deterioration (MURD).
FDMR Problem. Given an attack graph of an organization G, a
set of IoT devices D of types T , and the location constraints C, find
the deployment (deplf ull ) of IoT devices such that all of the IoT
devices are deployed subject to location constraints, and the risk
score R(deplf ull ) is minimized.
Definition 5.1 (Full Deployment with Minimal Risk (FDMR) Prob-
lem). Given the four-tuple < G,D,T ,C >, find deplf ull such that
R(deplf ull ) is minimized
argmin
deplf ul l
{R(deplf ull )}
MURD Problem. Given an attack graph of an organization G, a
set of IoT devices D of types T , and the location constraints C, find
the deployment that consists of the highest number of IoT devices
without increasing the risk score R.
Definition 5.2 (Maximal Utility without Risk Deterioration (MURD)
Problem). Given the four-tuple < G,D,T ,C >, find depl such that
|R(depl)| is maximized and R(depl) = R(deplempty )
argmax
depl
{|R(depl)| : R(depl) = R(deplempty )}
5.1 Search Space
Next, we define the search space for both FDMR and MURD. In
each case, the state of the search space is organized as a binary tree
where at each state a decision is made either to deploy (left child)
or not to deploy (right child) a particular IoT device in a particular
location. The root state is an empty deployment where no decisions
have been made yet. Every path from the root node of the search
space corresponds to a set of decisions. This means that a path from
the root to any state defines where some of the IoT devices are
deployed and where some other IoT devices cannot be deployed.
The set of left children along a path is a partial deployment of IoT
devices. In this way, we consider all possible deployments, subject
to location constraints.
For every node of the search space we derive the respective attack
graph Gdepl and compute the risk score R(depl). The goal nodes
depend on the specific problem. In the FDMR problem the goal
nodes include all states with a deployment that meets all of the
constraints, deplf ull and the objective is to identify the goal state
with the lowest risk score. In the MURD problem the goal states
include all states with a deployment that has the same risk score as
the initial state.
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5.2 Search Algorithm
For our heuristic search, we used the DFBnB algorithm (as described
in Section 2.4). The heuristic function will described later in this
section. As we mentioned above, each state in our search tree has
two children (left and right). In one, we added an IoT device to
the deployment in a certain location, and in the other, we did not
allow the IoT device to be deployed in that location. In practice,
each state has various options regarding which IoT devices to deploy.
We randomly chose one device (d) and one location (l) where d can
still be deployed and generate two children: deploy d at l and do not
deploy d at l . For the left child corresponding to the deploy decision,
we generate a new attack graph and recalculate the risk score and
the value of the heuristic function. We do not calculate the risk score
for the right (do not deploy) child, as this child’s risk score did not
change, since the risk score depends only on the deployed devices.
Heuristic Function. In order to calculate the heuristic functions,
we created a table of risk scores Table(depln ) which contains the
risk scores for each IoT device in each possible location. In other
words, we simulate the deployment of a single IoT device each time.
For each deployment, we update the table, removing the IoT device
that was deployed or not allowed to be deployed. If the length of
the shortest plan is shorter than the length of the shortest plan of the
initial state, the heuristic’s value in the table is zero.
Definition 5.3 (FDMR Heuristic Function). For the FDMR prob-
lem, the heuristic function underestimates the lowest possible change
in risk in every subtree. Then, whenever the risk score of the best
full deployment found so far is lower than the risk score of any
full deployment that can be found within a subtree, that subtree is
pruned.
For FDMR, lethFDMR (depln ) be the heuristic ofdepln .hFDMR (depln )
is the minimal R(depld ) and R(depld ) ∈ Table(depln ).
hFDMR (depln ) = argmin
d ∈D
{R(depld ) ∈ Table(depln )}
Intuitively, hFDMR underestimates the risk score because (1) in-
dividually each deployed device increases the risk according to
Table(depln ), but (2) together multiple deployed devices may result
in attack plans that were not accounted for yet.
Definition 5.4 (MURD Heuristic Function). For the MURD prob-
lem, the heuristic function overestimates the highest possible change
in the number of IoT devices that can be deployed without increasing
the risk. Then, whenever the number of devices deployed according
to the incumbent solution found so far is larger than the number
of devices that can possibly be deployed by continuing to search a
subtree, that subtree is pruned.
We want to deploy the highest number of IoT devices possible,
hence the heuristic function counts the number of IoT devices in
Table(depln ) with the same risk score as the root state. Let h(depln )
be the heuristic of depln . hMURD (depln ) is the number of devices
with a risk score equal to initial state R(deplempty ), such that
|R(depld ) = R(deplempty )| and R(depld ) ∈ Table(depln ).
hMURD (depln ) = |R(depld ) ∈ Table(depln ) : R(depld ) = R(deplempty )|
Intuitively, hMURD overestimates the number of devices that can be
deployed because (1) any IoT device that increases the risk according
to Table(depln ) cannot be deployed, and (2) even if individually a
Figure 3: Connectivity graph of the hosts in the organizational
network, derived from the VLAN topology.
The different colors represent the different VLANs. The blue nodes
are DMZ VLAN, and the orange nodes are the internal organization
network. Each node represents a host, and an edge indicates a
connection between two hosts.
set of deployed devices does not increase the risk score, together
they may result in an attack plan that was not available before.
6 EVALUATION
We conducted experiment for each one of the problems we wish to
solve: finding the full deployment with minimal risk (FDMR), and
finding the maximal utility without risk deterioration (MURD). For
both problems, we used the suggested DFBnB algorithm with the
heuristics described in Section 5.2.
6.1 Data Preparation
To evaluate our proposed method, we conducted a set of experiments
using an attack graph that was derived from a real organization
network.
Organization Network. The network of the organization is a real
network consisting of 24 hosts which was used by Gonda et al. [14].
The network of the organization was scanned using Nessus Scanner,
and then MulVAL was used to generate the attack graph based on the
scanning results. Figure 3 depicts the connectivity of the hosts in the
network, derived from the VLAN topology. Each node represents a
host, and an edge indicates a connection between two hosts.
An organization can have more than one host that it wishes to
protect, and this is translated to multiple targets for the attacker.
To simplify things, all target hosts are connected to an abstract
дoalHost , and the goal of the attack graph is to execute code in
this host. Executing code on the дoalHost proves that the attacker
managed to control one of the targeted hosts that led to the goal. As
part of the experimental setup we assume that the organization is free
from inside adversaries and that the potential attacker is located on
the Internet . The attack graph has a host that represents the Internet.
Detailed information on the scanning process is provided in [14].
Simulating IoT Devices. The network of the organization used
in the experiment does not include any IoT devices. Therefore, we
opt to simulate the IoT devices, their communication protocols, and
the constraints required for their deployment. We simulated three IoT
types (detector, refrigerator, camera), nine different IoT devices (four
detectors, two cameras, and three refrigerators), and eight locations
for the deployment of IoT devices.
In the simulation, the organization would like to deploy three
detectors for which there are four possible locations, one camera
8
Deployment Optimization of IoT Devices through Attack Graph Analysis WiSec ’19, May 15–17, 2019, Miami, FL, USA
for which there are two possible locations, and two refrigerators for
which there are two possible locations. Therefore, a total of six IoT
devices needed to be deployed.
Formally, as defined in Definition 4.2, the location constraints in
our simulation are defined as follows:
C(detector ) = ({ldet1 , ldet2 , ldet3 , ldet4 },3,{ddet1,ddet2,ddet3
,ddet4})
C(camera) = ({lcam1 , lcam2 }, 1, {dcam1,dcam2})
C(re f riдerator ) = ({lr ef1 , lr ef2 }, 2, {dr ef 1,dr ef 2,dr ef 3})
Using permutation1 and combination,2 we can calculate the total
number of options in the search space.
C43P
4
3 ·C21P21 ·C22P32 = 2304
Meaning, there are 2304 possible deployments.
Simulating Short-Range Communication. We simulated two
short-range communication protocols (ZigBee and Bluetooth) and
randomly divided them between all IoT devices and hosts so that
75% of the hosts have Bluetooth and 20% number of them have
Zigbee, and 40% of the IoT devices have Bluetooth and 90% of
them have Zigbee.
Simulating Vulnerabilities. In order to create potential attack
plans that include IoT devices, we simulated existing vulnerabilities
that can be exploited as follows. For each IoT device and for each
host, in addition to its known vulnerabilities (from the scanning
performed), we created a vulnerability based on the protocol used.
Simulating Physical Location of Hosts. The actual physical lo-
cation of the real hosts was unavailable. The location of the hosts is
important in order to simulate the proximity of the IoT devices to
the host, and consequently create potential attack plans involving the
IoT devices. Therefore, we randomly divided the hosts among the
eight simulated location ranges. Note that a host can be in proximity
to more than one IoT device.
6.2 Experimental Setup
The experiments were conducted on Hyper-V VM, with four virtual
CPUs (two cores) and 8GB RAM. The setup of the experiments is
as follow:
Number of Executions. In order to strengthen the validity of our
results, we executed the experiment forty times, using a different
host location each time. In other words, we simulated the physical
location of hosts forty times. The results in the next section are the
average results of all executions.
Evaluation Measures. We computed two measures: the first is
the execution time, and the second is the risk score of a suggested IoT
deployment (for the FDMR use case) or the number of deployable
IoT devices (for the MURD use case). The evaluation measures
were averaged over the all of the executions. The execution time is
important, since this can be a weak point, as one of the difficulties
in attack graphs and solutions that are based on attack graphs is
execution time.
Random Deployment. For comparison, we also ran both prob-
lems randomly as a baseline. This scenario represents an organi-
zation that randomly deploys IoT devices, without considering the
1Permutation Pnk mean that for n items, we want to find the number of ways k items
can be ordered.
2Combination Cnk is a selection of k items from a collection of size n, such that the
order of selection does not matter.
Figure 4: The blue graph indicates the average number of de-
vices deployed under security risk bound. The grey graph indi-
cates the average risk score of deployments with each number
of devices.
security aspect. That is to say, for the FDMR problem we randomly
deployed all IoT devices five times and took the average risk score
of all the deployments. In the MURD problem, each time we added
a device randomly and computed the risk score. We started with
no IoT devices deployed and continued until full deployment. We
ran five times each number of devices. This random baseline was
executed the same number of times as our algorithm (forty times).
6.3 Results
Table 1 presents the results. Note that the risk score only includes
the number of the shortest paths (OptCnt(Gdepl )). The length of the
shortest paths in all of the results presented is 29.
Full Deployment with Minimal Risk (FDMR). Full Deploy-
ment with Minimal Risk(FDMR). In the FDMR problem, the aver-
age risk score of all runs is 1229, an increase of 19% compared to
the risk score without any IoT devices which is 1032. The algorithm
took an average of 36 minutes to run, which is a reasonable amount
of time and provides an indication of its feasibility on a larger scale.
Maximal Utility without Risk Deterioration (MURD). In the
MURD problem, the average number of IoT devices that can be
deployed without affecting the security risk is 4.40. This number
means that, on average, four to five devices can be deployed without
any change in the risk score. It took the algorithm an average of 3.88
minutes to compute, which is also a reasonable time.
Random Deployment. In FDMR, the average risk score was
1494, which is an increase of 44% from the initial state. We can
see that randomly deploying IoT devices leads to less safe network,
compared to the increase of only 19% when using our algorithm.
In the MURD problem, the average risk score of deploying four
IoT devices is 1538. We chose four devices because with our algo-
rithm we managed to deploy an average of 4.40 devices without
influencing the security of the network. This result is also much
higher than the basic risk score of 1032, with no IoT devices de-
ployed. The average risk score of other numbers of devices can be
seen in Figure 4 (in grey), where we present the average risk score
of deployments with each number of devices, ranging from zero
(empty deployment) to six (full deployment).
Running Time. The average time for the algorithm to solve the
FDMR problem was 36 minutes, and for the MURD problem less
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Table 1: Results (average over 40 executions)
Problem
DFBnB Random Deployment
Risk Score (std) Devices Deployed (std) Time (min) Risk Score (std) Devices Deployed (std)
FDMR 1229 (239.41) 6 (0) 36.20 1494.46 (370.82) 6 (0)
MURD 1032 (0) 4.40 (1.13) 3.88 1538.95 (364.74) 4 (0)
than four minutes. In addition, the average time it took to compute
the risk score in all of the executions on both problems was less than a
second (0.95 seconds), and the average time to calculate the heuristic
was 2.85e−5 seconds. It took 23 seconds, on average, to compute the
heuristic table before the start of the algorithm. These measurements
are very low and practical, suggesting that the algorithm can run on
additional networks.
Additional Results. We investigated the trade-off between the
allowed risk of the IoT deployment and the maximal number of IoT
devices that can be deployed. Figure 4 further emphasizes the differ-
ence between random and optimal deployment of IoT devices. On
one hand, 4-5 randomly deployed IoT devices increase the number
of possible attack plans by 50%. On the other hand the same number
of IoT devices can be deployed with insignificant risk deterioration.
We can also see from Figure 4 that the difference between optimal
and random deployment strategies diminishes as we try to deploy
six IoT devices.
Figure 5 illustrates the challenge in finding the safest deployment
of IoT devices. The graph presents the cumulative distribution of
the risk scores of all deployments in one execution. The x-axis
is the cumulative risk score, and the y-axis is the percentage of
deployments for which the risk score is less than x . As can be seen,
50% of the deployments have a risk score lower than 1458. Moreover,
only 16 deployments (0.7% of all deployments) are optimal, with a
risk score of 1134, i.e., the chances of a random selection to choose
an optimal deployment in that execution was 0.007.
The risk score of an optimal deployment may change when new
vulnerabilities are discovered, leading to potentially inferior de-
ployment. To conclude the experimental evaluation we tested the
robustness of the optimal deployment of an arbitrary execution from
the FDMR problem, with risk score of 1134. We perturbed vulnera-
bilities of 10% and 20% of the devices in the network by discarding
all current vulnerabilities of the chosen devices and randomly assign-
ing new vulnerabilities as described in Section 6.1. This process was
repeated 10 times. The average risk score of the optimal deployment
after changing 10% and 20% of the vulnerabilities varied by 1%-10%
in both directions. Some times the risk of the optimal deployment
increased and some times it dropped. Overall the changes in the risk
of the optimal deployment due to perturbation of the vulnerabilities
were not statistically significant.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We present a novel method for suggesting the optimal deployment
(in terms of the security risk) of a set of IoT devices within an
organization. In order to accomplish this, we augmented the conven-
tional attack graph to include short-range communication protocols
inherent to IoT devices. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
Figure 5: The x-axis is the cumulative risk score, and the y-axis
is the percentage of deployments for which the risk score is less
than x .
first work that takes the physical location of devices and different
communication protocols into account.
We demonstrated the importance of planning a deployment of IoT
devices by solving two scenarios, approaching them as an optimiza-
tion problem. We proposed a novel method for evaluating the risk of
IoT device deployment using an augmented attack graph, and used
the proposed method to address these two scenarios. Our results
revealed the potential risk in deploying IoT devices in organizations
and showed that randomly deploying devices can greatly affect the
security of the organization’s network. We solved the two scenarios
on a real organization with a small to medium sized network, with a
running time of less than an hour.
Our algorithm, and in particular, our heuristic approach, assumes
that the potential risk of two deployed devices is greater than or
equal to the sum of their individual risk scores. Any method of risk
calculation that satisfies this assumption can be used in the algorithm.
The method of risk score calculation used in this paper has some
limitations. It does not take the cost of different exploits into account,
which can be a major consideration for an attacker. As a result, the
method does not capture the heterogeneity and homogeneity of
vulnerabilities along an attack path. In addition, the method only
considers the shortest paths, but an attacker can choose a longer path,
for various reasons.
Future work may extend the current research in the following
directions. First, it is desirable to increase sizes of the attack graph
that can be optimized by providing more accurate heuristic functions.
In addition, the optimization methods proposed in this paper should
be tested with variety of risk scores that encompass the true cost
of the attack, the probability of the attack success, or both. Finally,
cyber-physical capabilities of IoT devices as well as their unique
functionalities should be incorporated into an extended model.
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